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It is called blind quantum computation(BQC) that a client who has limited quantum technologies
can delegate her quantum computing to a server who has fully-advanced quantum computers. But
the privacy of the client’s quantum inputs, algorithms and outputs is still a challenge. To realize
a secure BQC, we mainly study how to hide quantum fourier transform (QFT) performed on Bell
states. In this paper, three cases are considered as follows. For the first case, we design primary BQC
protocols of QFT performed on qubits 12 of belonging to {|φ±〉12, |ψ±〉12} with relevant circuits.
To strengthen security, we construct enhanced BQC protocols of QFT performed on qubits 13 of
any two Bell states |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34 with relevant quantum circuits. Featured the property of stronger
security, we give generalized BQC protocols of QFT performed on qubits 13 and 24 of any two Bell
states with relevant quantum circuits respectively. At last, we analyze and prove the blindness and
correctness.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud.
I. INTRODUCTION
When quantum computers are realized in the style of
‘cloud’, only a few companies can possess them because
of expensive prices. Many clients will have requirements
of quantum computation but they have limited quantum
technologies. They outsource their quantum computa-
tion to servers, but how to ensure that clients’ secrets
are not leaked? Fortunately, Blind quantum computa-
tion (BQC) is proposed to solve this problem securely
[1–12]. In BQC, a client who has few quantum tech-
nologies at her disposal delegates her quantum compu-
tation to servers who have full-advanced quantum com-
puters without sacrificing the privacy of her quantum
inputs, outputs and algorithms. In 2005, Childs [1] first
presented blind quantum computation based on circuits,
where the client Alice has the abilities to store quantum
states and route her qubits, and the server Bob can per-
form universal quantum computation. Fisher et al. [2]
realized quantum computation {X,Z,H,S,R,CNOT} on
encrypted quantum states similar to homomorphic en-
cryption [13]. They use linear optics to implement a
proof-of-principle of the protocol. Broadbent [3] intro-
duced an entanglement-based protocol such that it only
needs multiple auxiliary qubits or two-way quantum com-
munication.
In 2009, Broadbent et al. [5] first implemented an uni-
versal BQC protocol by measuring on blind graph states,
i.e. brickwork states, where the client has the abilities
to prepare single qubits randomly chosen from a finite
set { 1√
2
(|0〉 + eiθ|1〉)|θ = 0, pi4 , 2pi4 , . . . , 7pi4 }. The brick-
work sate is composed of many unit cluster entangled
states presented in [6]. They exploited the conceptual
framework of measurement-based quantum computation
to implement an experimental demonstration ensuring
∗ cryptjweng@gmail.com
the privacy of quantum inputs, computations, and out-
puts. After that, double-server and triple-server BQC
protocols were proposed in Refs. [7–9].
Recently, verifiable BQC protocols widely attract a lot
of attentions [14–21]. Morimae [14] proposed two verifi-
able BQC protocols. In the first BQC protocol, the server
Bob sends resource states |Ψ〉 = |R〉⊗|+〉⊗N/3⊗|0〉⊗N/3,
which is a N-qubit state and |R〉 is an N/3-qubit univer-
sal resource state, to the client Alice. In this protocol,
if all measurements on traps show the correct results,
the probability for changes in a logical state of Alice’s
computation is exponentially small. In the second pro-
tocol, it did not use any traps but the properties of the
topological code. The no-signaling principle guarantees
the device-independent security, that is, the second BQC
protocol is also verifiable. The stabilizer testing [15] is
used to verify the correctness of quantum computation,
where Alice can obtain the correct computation results if
Bob is honest to generate the correct graph state. But if
Bob is malicious to prepare a fake graph state, Alice can
directly examine the stabilizers of these graph states to
verify Bob’s honesty. Since the quantum channel noises
are unavoidable in practical quantum communication,
numerous anti-noise BQC protocols [7, 9, 22, 23] are pro-
posed to solve them. Such as Takeuchi et al. [23] used
decoherence-free subspace (DFS) to resist a collective-
noise of quantum channels. There are also some other
interesting BQC protocols to improve the functions fur-
ther [24–34]. For example, in [33], Huang et al. imple-
mented a proof-of-principle experiment to complete the
factorization of the number 15 in which the client is clas-
sical.
In this paper, we study the quantum fourier transform
(QFT) inspired by these works [35–38]. In [35], Mar-
quezino et al. used QR decomposition to convert the
classical fourier transform algorithm into the quantum
fourier transform. Motivated by these works in [7, 8],
we consider Bell states as carrier in quantum channel
to realize QFT. Bell states have already been prepared
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2in experiment [39–41]. To be specific, in our proposed
BQC protocols, the trusted center bears the task to pre-
pare enough initial Bell states {|φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉},
server Bob performs those operations in circuits, and the
client Alice is almost classical. In these BQC protocols,
the QFT can be replaced by other operators to get the
target quantum states and Alice needs to communicate
with Bob multiple rounds. Our main contributions are
as follows.
(1) We analyze and present these primary BQC pro-
tocols with the equivalent quantum circuits of QFT per-
formed on qubits 12 of Bell states {|φ±〉12, |ψ±〉12};
(2) We discuss and show these enhanced BQC proto-
cols with the equivalent quantum circuits of QFT per-
formed on qubits 13 of any two Bell states |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34
where |ξ〉12 and |θ〉34 are Bell states;
(3) We give these generalized BQC protocols with the
equivalent quantum circuits of QFT performed respec-
tively on qubits 13, 24 of any two Bell states;
(4) In the end, we prove the blindness and correctness
for every BQC protocol, where the proof of the correct-
ness is attached in Appendix I, II and III.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
basic knowledges about QFT are introduced in Sec.II.
We propose the BQC protocols in Sec. III. The analysis
of blindness and correctness is presented in Sec. IV. At
last, the conclusions are drawn in Sec. V.
II. PRILIMENARIES
The quantum Fourier transform is introduced in
Ref.[42]. We review the principle of quantum Fourier
transform in this section for obtaining our BQC proto-
cols.
We use the mathematical notation to describe the dis-
crete Fourier transform as follows
yk =
1√
N
N−1∑
j=0
e
2piijk
N xj ,
where i2 = −1, k, j = 0, . . . , N−1, the input is denoted as
a vector of complex numbers {x0, x1, . . . , xN−1} and the
output is a vector of complex numbers {y0, y1, . . . , yN−1}
(N is the length of the vector). Identically, in quantum
mechanics system, the quantum Fourier transform on or-
thonormal basis |0〉,. . .,|N − 1〉 is defined as
QFTN |j〉 =
1√
N
N−1∑
k=0
e
2piijk
N |k〉,
and the unitary matrix QFTN is given by
QFTN =
1√
N

1 1 1 . . . 1
1 ω ω2 . . . ωN−1
1 ω2 ω4 . . . ω2(N−1)
1 ω3 ω6 · · · ω3(N−1)
...
...
...
...
...
1 ωN−1 ω2(N−1) · · · ω(N−1)(N−1)
 ,
where N = 2n and ω = e
2pii
2n . When N = 4 = 22 and
phase ω = i, the transformation matrix
QFT4 =
1
2
 1 1 1 11 i −1 −i1 −1 1 −1
1 −i −1 i
 ,
By performing quantum Fourier transform, an arbitrary
state
∑N−1
j=0 xj |j〉 will be changed into
N−1∑
j=0
xj |j〉 QFT−−−→
N−1∑
k=0
yk|k〉,
where the amplitudes yk are the discrete Fourier
transform values of amplitudes xj . Suppose the
state |j〉 = |j1, j2, . . . , jn〉 represents the binary j =∑n
i=1 ji2
n−i. The notation 0.jljl+1 . . . jm represent the
binary
∑m−l
i=0 jl+i/2
i+1.
The quantum circuit for the quantum Fourier trans-
form is shown in FIG. 1. Hadamard gate operated on the
j-th qubit is denoted as Hj : |j〉 7→ 1/
√
2(|0〉+ (−1)j |1〉).
The Gk denotes the unitary transformation, which is ex-
pressed as
Gk =
(
1 0
0 e2pii/2
k
)
.
12 0.0 1ni j je  
22 0.0 1ni j je  
2 0.0 1ni je 
12 0.0 1n ni j je  
1j
2j
1nj 
nj
1nG 
H 2nG  1nG 

2G

nGH 2G
H
H
 
FIG. 1. The quantum circuit for quantum Fourier transform.
In the circuit, when the state |j〉 = |j1 . . . jn〉 is input,
we get
|j〉 QFT−−−→ 1
2n/2
2n−1∑
k=0
e2piijk/2
n |k〉
=
1
2n/2
1∑
k1=0
· · ·
1∑
kn=0
e2piij(
∑n
l=1 kl2
−l)|k1 · · · kn〉
...
...
=
1
2n/2
(|0〉+ e2pii0.jn |1〉)(|0〉+ e2pii0.jn−1jn |1〉)
· · · (|0〉+ e2pii0.j1j2...jn |1〉).
where N = 2n and the computational basis |0〉, . . . , |2n−
1〉 is given. This construction also proves that the quan-
tum Fourier transform is unitary, since each gate in the
3circuit is unitary. In FIG. 2, For double-qubit,
|00〉 QFT−−−→ 1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(|0〉+ |1〉),
|01〉 QFT−−−→ 1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)(|0〉+ i|1〉),
|10〉 QFT−−−→ 1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(|0〉 − |1〉),
|11〉 QFT−−−→ 1
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)(|0〉 − i|1〉).
(1)
1 22 0.0 1i j je 
22 0.0 1i je 1j
2j
H S
H
FIG. 2. Quantum Fourier transform is performed on two
qubits of Bell states {|φ±〉12, |ψ±〉12}.
We introduce the characteristics of some common gates
since they have be used in our BQC protocols. For single-
qubit gates, we have
X : |j〉 → |j ⊕ 1〉, S : |j〉 → ij |j〉,
Z : |j〉 → (−1)j |j〉, T : |j〉 → (e ipi4 )j |j〉. (2)
For the double-qubit gates, we have
CNOT : |j〉|k〉 → |j〉|j ⊕ k〉,
CS : |j〉|k〉 → ijk|j〉|k〉,
CZ : |j〉|k〉 → (−1)jk|j〉|k〉.
(3)
where C is controlled.
The relationship between SWAP and CNOT, CS, CZ
and CT, S, Z and T.
SWAP12 = CNOT12CNOT21CNOT12.
CZ12 = CS
2
12 = CT
4
12, Z = S
2 = T4.
(4)
III. BQC PROTOCOLS FOR QUANTUM
FOURIER TRANSFORM BASED ON BELL
STATES
A. Architecture of BQC protocols
The process of BQC protocols for QFT is described as
follows. It contains five steps:
1) A trusted center prepares enough initial |φ+〉 states
and sends to Alice.
2) Alice disturbs the positions and sends qubits to Bob.
3) Bob performs the relative operations and returns
results to Alice.
4)They repeat steps 2) and 3) until the computation
halts, but Bob does not know which qubit he receives
during the whole period.
Alice designs every quantum circuit which is equiva-
lent to QFT performed on Bell states (See FIG. 3, FIG.
4 and FIG. 5). To improved the blindness, we adds
some auxiliary gates in these BQC protocols. If a cir-
cuit lacks one gate of {CT,T,X,H,CNOT}, the gate
should be added as a auxiliary gate. That is, it must
ensure that every circuit is composed of CT, T, X, H
and CNOT. For example, in FIG. 4, gates X, CNOT
and T should be added as auxiliary gates. However, in
order that auxiliary gates do not affect the original cir-
cuits, Bob needs to perform eight rounds CT and T gates,
where CT8 = T8 = I, and two rounds gates X, H, CNOT,
where X2 = H2 = CNOT2 = I. Therefore, we suppose
that these auxiliary gates are performed randomly but
not shown on the FIG.4, FIG.5 and FIG.6.
All BQC protocols are started in an intersecting way
but the order of operations for every gate is not changed.
To be precise, the order of execution must be from the
first round to the last round. But for different circuits,
they can be implemented in an intersectional way.
B. Primary BQC protocols of two-qubit QFT on
one Bell state
To show our method clearly, we first design the a pri-
mary BQC model, that is, the QFT is performed on two
qubits of one Bell state with the equivalent quantum cir-
cuits in FIG. 3.
1
2
12 
2H 2T
1H
FIG. 3. The equivalent quantum circuits of QFT performed
on 12 of |χ〉12 (|χ〉12 belongs to {|φ±〉12, |ψ±〉12}).
BQC protocol 1. For Bell states |χ〉12 belonging
to {|φ±〉12, |ψ±〉12}, Bob performs one round H2, two
rounds CT12 and one round H1. Bob returns results to
Alice and Alice obtains QFT12|χ〉12.
Notation: In FIG. 3, the subscripts 1 and 2 of H1 and
H2 represent which qubit is performed on the gate. In
FIG. 4 and FIG. 5, the meanings of the expression are
similar.
C. Enhanced BQC protocols of two-qubit QFT on
two Bell states
We have considered two Bell states in section B but its
security is not strong enough. What’s more, in some
cases, Alice wants to obtain the results that QFT is
performed on two qubits belonged to two Bell states
respectively. So we propose the enhanced BQC pro-
tocols QFT on 13 of |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34. The equivalent
quantum circuits is given in FIG. 4. For |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34
(|ξ〉12, |θ〉34 ∈ {|φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉}), it should be six-
teen cases. Based on these above cases, we design these
corresponding BQC protocols as follows.
42
3
4
2M
2H
4H
2T 12 34 
 
2
3
4
2M
2H
4H
2T 12 34 
 
2
3
4
2M
2H
4H
2T 12 34 
 
4X
1
2
3
1M 2H
4H 2T
 12 34  
4
4
3T
4X
1
2
3
1M 2H
4H 6T
 12 34  
4
2
1T1
2
3
1M 2H
4H 2T
 12 34  
4
1
2
3
1M 2H
4H 6T
 12 34  
4
2
1T 1
2
3
1M 2H
4H 6T
 12 34  
4
2
1T
4
3T
4
4T
1
2
3
1M 2H2X
2T
 12 34  
4
4
1T
4H
1
2
3
1M 2H2X
6T
 12 34  
4
6
1T
4H
1
2
3
1M 2H2X
6T
 12 34  
4
2
1T
4H
4
1T 2
3 2M
2H2X
2T 12 34 
 
4
4
3T
4H
2
3 2M
2H2X
2T 12 34 
 
4 4H4X
1
2
3
1M 2H2X
6T
 12 34  
4
6
1T
4H4X
4
3T
1
2
3
1M 2H2X
2T
 12 34  
4
4
1T
4H4X
4
3T
1
2
3 2M
2H42T
6T 12 34  
4
4
1T
4H4X
6
3T43T
1
2
3
 1M 23
4
 2M
FIG. 4. The equivalent quantum circuits of QFT performed on 13 of |ξ〉12⊗|θ〉34 (|ξ〉12 and |θ〉34 are Bell states). M1 represents
the SWAP13 and M2 represents the SWAP24.
BQC protocol 2. For |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34, |ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 and
|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34, we first describe the same operations (FIG.
4). That is, Bob performs three rounds CNOT(i.e.
CNOT24, CNOT42 and CNOT24), two rounds H (H2
and H4) and two rounds CT32. However, the slight
different operations are implemented. After the same
operations, a CNOT42 is carried out in the circuit of
|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34. A X4 needs to be implemented in the cir-
cuit of |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34 before the same operations. Bob
returns these operated qubits to Alice and thus Alice
will obtain QFT13|ψ+〉12|φ−〉34, QFT13|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 and
QFT13|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34.
BQC protocol 3. For |φ+〉12|φ+〉34, |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34,
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34, |φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 and |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, the same
operations are showed. Bob performs three rounds
CNOT(i.e. CNOT13, CNOT31 and CNOT13), two
rounds H (H2 and H4) and two rounds CT14. Some
different operations are as follows after above same
operations. 1) For |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34, Bob performs two
rounds T1 and four rounds CT14. 2) For |φ+〉12|φ−〉34,
four rounds T1 and two rounds CT34 are carried out
by Bob. 3) For |φ+〉12|ψ−〉34, Bob performs two
rounds T1 and four rounds CT14. 4) For |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34,
Bob performs four rounds T1, two rounds T3, four
rounds T4 and four rounds CT14. Particularly, X4
needs to be performed before implementing H4 for
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34. Bob returns those operated qubits to Alice
and Alice gets QFT13|φ+〉12|φ+〉34, QFT13|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34,
QFT13|φ+〉12|φ−〉34, QFT13|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 and QFT13
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34.
BQC protocol 4. For |φ−〉12|φ+〉34, |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34,
|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 and |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34, the same operations
are that Bob implements X2, three rounds CNOT(i.e.
CNOT13, CNOT31 and CNOT13) and two rounds H (H2
5and H4). After that, we discuss the different operations
in different circuits. 1) Bob executes four rounds T1 and
two rounds CT34 for |φ−〉12|φ+〉34. 2) Bob performs six
rounds T1 and six rounds CT14 for |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34. 3)
Bob performs two rounds T1, six rounds CT14 and four
rounds T1 for |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34. 4) Bob executes four rounds
T3 and two rounds CT32. Bob returns them to Alice and
Alice receives QFT13|φ−〉12|φ+〉34, QFT13|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34,
QFT13|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 and QFT13|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34.
BQC protocol 5. For |ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34,
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 and |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, we first analyze the al-
most same operations. Bob performs two rounds L( for
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 and |φ−〉12|φ−〉34, L repre-
sents X2 and X4. But for |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34 , L represents
that four rounds T2 and four rounds T3), three rounds
CNOT( {CNOT13,CNOT31,CNOT13} for |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34
and |φ−〉12|φ−〉34, {CNOT24,CNOT42,CNOT24} for
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34 and |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34) and two rounds H (H2
and H4). After that we show the rest of opera-
tions for different cases. 1) Bob performs two rounds
CT32 in circuit of |ψ−〉12|φ+〉34. 2) Bob performs six
rounds T1, four rounds T3 and six rounds CT14 for
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34. 3) Four rounds T1, four rounds T3 and
two rounds CT14 are carried out for |φ−〉12|φ−〉34. 4)
Four rounds T1, six rounds T3 and six rounds CT32 are
executed for |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34. Bob returns them to Alice
and Alice gets QFT13|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, QFT13|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34,
QFT13|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 and QFT13|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34.
D. generalized BQC protocols of two-qubit QFT
on two Bell states
As we all know, in section C, we propose enhanced
BQC protocols for two-qubit QFT on qubits 13 of two
Bell states |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34. However, there exist some com-
plicated operations which makes the algorithms to be not
so perfect in the performance and blindness. For this is-
sue, we consider to simplify these circuits and construct
more strong secure BQC protocols for two-qubit QFT
performed on 13 and 24 of two Bell states |ξ〉12 ⊗ |θ〉34
(See FIG. 5). The detailed BQC protocols are listed as
follows.
BQC protocol 6. For |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34
and |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34, they share the same operations, i.e.
Bob performs H1, two rounds T1, two rounds T2 and
four rounds CT24. Before four rounds CT24, there
are some differences. 1) For |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, Bob per-
forms four rounds CT31. 2) For |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34, Bob
also needs to perform four rounds CT41. 3) For
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34, Bob performs four rounds CT31 and four
rounds T4. Bob returns them to Alice and Alice obtains
QFT13QFT24|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, QFT13QFT24|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34
and QFT13QFT24|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34.
BQC protocol 7. For |φ−〉12|φ+〉34 and |φ−〉12|φ−〉34,
they share the same operations: Bob performs six rounds
T1, one round H2, two rounds T2, four rounds T3 and
X4 except that an additional operation X2 performed be-
hind two rounds T2 for |φ−〉12|φ+〉34. Bob returns them
to Alice and Alice gets QFT13QFT24 |φ−〉12|φ+〉34 and
QFT13QFT24|φ−〉12|φ−〉34.
BQC protocol 8. For |φ+〉12|φ+〉34, |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34
and |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34, they begin with same operations
CNOT on different qubits, i.e. qubits 24 and
qubits 23. After that, Alice will get the aim
states for |φ+〉12|φ+〉34. But for |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34, Bob
also needs to perform X2 and four rounds T3.
Then Bob returns to Alice such that Alice receives
QFT13QFT24|φ+〉12|φ+〉34, QFT13QFT24|ψ+〉12|φ−〉34
and QFT13QFT24|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34.
BQC protocol 9. For |ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 and |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34,
they begin with same operations one round H1, two
rounds T1 and two rounds T2. Some different opera-
tions exist in two circuits. 1) For |ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 , Bob
continues to perform four rounds T3 and four rounds
CT23. 2) But for |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34, Bob performs X2 be-
fore two rounds T2. Then an operation X4 is performed
by Bob after other operations. At last, Bob returns to
Alice and Alice obtains QFT13QFT24|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 and
QFT13QFT24|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34.
BQC protocol 10. The rest of cases are listed as
follows. 1) For |φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 and |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34, they
share the completely same circuits. That is, Bob per-
forms four rounds T1, one round X2, six rounds T3
and one round X4. 2) For |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, Bob performs
four rounds T1, two rounds T3 and four rounds T4.
3) For |ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, Bob performs six rounds T2, one
round H2, two rounds T2, one round X2, one round
X3 and four rounds T4. 4) For |φ+〉12|φ−〉34, Bob per-
forms four rounds T3, one round CNOT32, one round
X3 and one round X4. 5) For |ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34, Bob per-
forms four rounds T1, two rounds T4 and one round
X4. In the end, Bob returns to Alice and Alice obtains
QFT13QFT24|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34, QFT13QFT24|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34,
QFT13QFT24|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, QFT13QFT24|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34,
QFT13QFT24|φ+〉12|φ−〉34, QFT13QFT24|ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34.
IV. ANALYSIS OF BLINDNESS AND
CORRECTNESS
Since all BQC protocols have been described in detail,
we prove that they are correct and blindness in this sec-
tion. Here we regard blindness as the privacy of clients’
quantum inputs, algorithms and outputs. For blindness,
we give the unified proof because all BQC protocols are
performed crossways. While for correctness, we give the
proof respectively according to their own properties.
For quantum inputs, These initial Bell states
{|φ±〉, |ψ±〉} are prepared by the trusted center only
known buy Alice. Alice also adds some trap operations
and disturbs the order. When Alice sends one qubit or
two qubits to Bob, he gets nothing about Alice’s inputs
because he dare not measure in ease. If Bob receives
one qubit, it belongs to one standard Bell state or one
evolutive Bell state, where standard Bell states are the
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FIG. 5. The equivalent quantum circuits of QFT performed on 13, 24.
original Bell states (i.e. {|φ±〉, |ψ±〉}), the evolutive Bell
states represent some operations performed on original
Bell states. If Bob receives two qubits, they respectively
belong to one Bell state or two Bell states which is stan-
dard or evolutive. If Bob measures the qubits he received,
it will result in destroying of entanglement or collapsion
of quantum states. Therefore, it is impossible for Bob to
get anything, keeping the Alice’s inputs private in these
BQC protocols.
Now, we consider respectively quantum algorithm
and outputs, where quantum algorithm is the quantum
Fourier transform in our protocols. For quantum Fourier
transform , it is decomposed into several independent
unitary operations. In every round, Bob only performs
partial unitary operators because all BQC protocols are
running crossways.Therefore, Alice can successfully hide
quantum algorithms and thus guarantees the blindness of
QFT. Then we give respectively the definitions of blind-
ness for the algorithm and outputs as follows.
Definition A single-server BQC protocol is blind if given
all the classical information Bob can obtain during the
protocol.
(1) The blindness of algorithm: the conditional probabil-
ity distribution of Bob’s operators is equal to the priori
probability distribution of Bob’s operators;
(2) The blindness of outputs: the conditional probabil-
ity distribution of the output quantum states that Alice
wants to get is equal to the priori probability distribution
of the output quantum states.
Proof: In our proposed primary, enhanced and gen-
eralized BQC protocols, Bob’s knowledge from Alice’s
classical information contains Bell states and opera-
tions. Such as the conditional probability distribution
of SWAPj is given by CNOTj and Γj = j, where Γj rep-
resents rotations. For the reason that SWAPj , CNOTj
and Γj are completely independent, SWAPj is unknown
to Bob in these BQC protocols. Based on Bayes’ theo-
rem, we have
p(SWAPj | CNOTj ,Γj)
7=
p(CNOTj | Γj ,SWAPj)p(SWAPj ,CNOTj)
p(CNOTj ,Γj)
=
p(CNOTj | Γj ,SWAPj)p(SWAPj)p(CNOTj)
p(CNOTj ,Γj)p(CNOTj)
= p(SWAPj).
So these protocols satisfy the definition (1).
Similarly, we can show that QFTj is unknown to Bob
as follows.
p(QFTj | Xj ,Γj)
=
p(Xj | QFTj ,Γj)p(QFTj ,Xj)
p(Xj | Γj)p(Xj)
=
p(Xj | QFTj ,Γj)p(QFTj)p(Xj)
p(Xj | Γj)p(Xj)
= p(QFTj).
So these protocols also satisfy the definition (2). For
gates T,CT,H, we have the same conclusions by similar
proof processes. Therefore, the algorithm and outputs
in all BQC protocols are blind. So far, we have proved
blindness for inputs, algorithm and outputs in our pro-
posed BQC protocols.
In the end, we analyze the correctness in Appendix
I, II, and III. We prove that these BQC protocols are
correct.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new blind quantum compu-
tation protocol of quantum Fourier transform performed
on Bell states. We divide into three cases to discuss:
primary BQC protocols for QFT on one Bell state, en-
hanced BQC protocols for QFT on two Bell states and
generalized BQC protocols for QFT on two Bell states.
At last, we give the proof of blindness and correctness
for all BQC protocols. In a word, our works give a bet-
ter understanding for quantum Fourier transform. For
further work, we will try to construct BQC protocols on
multi-qubit for QFT.
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Appendix I: Proof of the Correctness of primary
BQC protocols
First, we consider that QFT is performed on qubits 12
of Bell states.
1) For |φ+〉12, this equation
|φ+〉12 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
[|+〉|+〉+ 1√
2
|−〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12 H2−−→ 1
2
[|0〉(|0〉+ |1〉) + |1〉(|0〉 − |1〉)]12
CT212−−−→ 1
2
[|0〉(|0〉+ |1〉) + |1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12
H1−−→ 1√
2
[|+〉|+〉+ 1√
2
|−〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12.
2) For |φ−〉12, this equation
|φ−〉12 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
[|+〉|+〉 − 1√
2
|−〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12 H2−−→ 1
2
[|0〉(|0〉+ |1〉)− |1〉(|0〉 − |1〉)]12
CT212−−−→ 1
2
[|0〉(|0〉+ |1〉)− |1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12
H1−−→ 1√
2
[|+〉|+〉 − 1√
2
|−〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]12.
3) For |ψ+〉12, this equation
|ψ+〉12 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
[
1√
2
|−〉(|0〉+ i|1〉) + |+〉|−〉]12.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12 H2−−→ 1
2
√
2
[|0〉(|0〉 − |1〉) + |1〉(|0〉+ |1〉)]12
CT212−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[|0〉(|0〉 − |1〉) + |1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]12
H1−−→ 1√
2
[
1√
2
(|+〉|−〉+ |−〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]12.
4) For |ψ−〉12, this equation
|ψ−〉12 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
[
1√
2
(|−〉|0〉+ i|1〉)− | −+〉]12.
9is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12 H2−−→ 1
2
√
2
[|0〉(|0〉 − |1〉)− |1〉(|0〉+ |1〉)]12
CT212−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[|0〉(|0〉 − |1〉)− |1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]12
H1−−→ 1√
2
[
1√
2
[|+〉|−〉 − |−〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]12
Appendix II: Proof of the Correctness of
enhanced BQC protocols
In the following, we consider that QFT is performed
on 13 of |ξ〉12|θ〉34.
1) For |φ+〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
[|0 + 0+〉+ 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1 + 0−〉+ 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|φ+〉34 SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉+ |1001〉+ |0110〉+ |1111〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0+〉+ |1 + 0−〉+ |0− 1+〉+ |1− 1−〉)3214
CT214−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉+ 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1 + 0−〉+ 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
2) For |φ+〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0−〉+ 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1 + 0+〉+ 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34 X4−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |0010〉+ |1101〉 − |1110〉)3214
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |1000〉+ |0111〉 − |1110〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
4
(|0 + 0−〉 − |1 + 0+〉+ |0− 1−〉 − |1− 1+〉)3124
T43−−→ 1
4
(|0 + 0−〉+ |1 + 0+〉+ |0− 1−〉+ |1− 1+〉)3214
CT214−−−→ 1
4
[|0 + 0−〉+ 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1 + 0+〉+ 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
3) For |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉+ |0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1 + 0−〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉))]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉+ |1000〉+ |0111〉+ |1110〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉+ |1 + 0+〉+ |0− 1−〉+ |1− 1+〉)3214
T21−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉+ |1 + 0+〉+ i|0− 1−〉+ i|1− 1+〉)3214
T43T
4
4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0+〉 − |1 + 0−〉+ i|0− 1+〉 − i|1− 1−〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉+ i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1 + 0−〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
4) For |φ+〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ −1
2
[|0 + 0−〉+ i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |1000〉+ |0111〉 − |1110〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉 − |1 + 0+〉+ |0− 1−〉 − |1− 1+〉)3214
T21−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉 − |1 + 0+〉+ i|0− 1−〉 − i|1− 1+〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0−〉+ i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
5) For |φ−〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0− 0+〉+ 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1− 0−〉+ 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 X2−−→ 1
2
(|0100〉+ |0111〉 − |1000〉 − |1011〉)1234
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
|0100〉+ |1101〉 − |0010〉 − |1011〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0+〉+ |1− 0−〉 − |0 + 1+〉 − |1 + 1−〉)3214
CT214−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1− 0−〉 − 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214
T41−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉+ 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1− 0−〉+ 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
6) For |φ−〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉+ 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1− 0+〉+ 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
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is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 X2X4−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉+ |1010〉)1234
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |1100〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |1− 0+〉 − |0 + 1−〉+ |1 + 1+〉)3214
T43T
4
1−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉+ |1− 0+〉+ |0 + 1−〉+ |1 + 1+〉)3214
CT214−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉+ 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1− 0+〉+ 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
7) For |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉+ i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1− 0−〉 − i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34 T
4
2T
4
3−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |0010〉+ |1101〉 − |1110〉)1432
SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0100〉 − |0010〉+ |1101〉 − |1011〉)1432
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0+〉 − |0 + 1+〉+ |1− 0−〉 − |1 + 1−〉)1432
T41T
6
3−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0+〉 − |1− 0−〉+ i|0 + 1+〉 − i|1 + 1−〉)1432
CT632−−−→ 1
2
[|0− 0+〉+ i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1− 0−〉 − i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1432.
8) For |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ −1
2
[|0− 0−〉+ i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1− 0+〉 − i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 X2−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉+ |1010〉)1234
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |1100〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |1− 0+〉 − |0 + 1−〉+ |1 + 1+〉)3214
T61−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |1− 0+〉+ i|0 + 1−〉 − i|1 + 1+〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[|0− 0−〉+ i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1− 0+〉 − i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
9) For |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1 + 0−〉 − 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34 X2−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉+ |1111〉)1234
SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0110〉+ |1001〉+ |1111〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0+〉+ |1 + 0−〉+ |0− 1+〉+ |1− 1−〉)3214
CT232T
4
3−−−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1 + 0−〉 − 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214
10) For |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0−〉 − 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1 + 0+〉 − 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|φ+〉34 SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |0111〉+ |1000〉 − |1110〉)1432
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉 − |0− 1−〉+ |1 + 0+〉 − |1− 1+〉)3214
CT232−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1 + 0+〉 − 1√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214
11) For |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1 + 0−〉+ i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 X2X4−−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉+ |0011〉+ |1100〉+ |1111〉)1234
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉+ |1001〉+ |0110〉+ |1111〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0+〉+ |1 + 0−〉+ |0− 1+〉+ |1− 1−〉)3214
T43T
6
1−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0+〉 − |1 + 0−〉 − i|0− 1+〉+ i|1− 1−〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1 + 0−〉+ i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
12) For |ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ −1
2
[|0 + 0−〉 − i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
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is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34 X2−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉 − |0010〉+ |1101〉 − |1110〉)1234
SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0000〉 − |1000〉+ |0111〉 − |1110〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉 − |1 + 0+〉+ |0− 1−〉+ |1− 1+〉)3214
T21−−→ 1
2
(|0 + 0−〉 − |1 + 0+〉+ i|0− 1−〉+ i|1− 1+〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0−〉+ i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1 + 0+〉 − i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214
T41−−→ 1
2
[|0 + 0−〉 − i√
2
|0− 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1 + 0+〉) + i√
2
|1− 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214
13) For |ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1− 0−〉 − 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34 X2X4−−−→ 1
2
(|0001〉+ |0010〉 − |1101〉 − |1110〉)3214
Z2Z3−−−→ 12 (|0001〉 − |0010〉+ |1101〉 − |1110〉)3214
SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |1100〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉)1432
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0+〉+ |1− 0−〉+ |0 + 1+〉 − |1 + 1−〉)3214
CT232−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
+|1− 0−〉)− 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
14) For |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34 X4−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0110〉 − |1001〉+ |1010〉)3214
SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0011〉 − |1100〉+ |1010〉)1432
T41−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0011〉+ |1100〉 − |1010〉)1432
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |0 + 1−〉+ |1− 0+〉 − |1 + 1+〉)3214
CT232−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
+|1− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
15) For |ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉 − i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1− 0−〉+ i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 SWAP24−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉+ |0011〉 − |1100〉 − |1010〉)1432
T43−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |0011〉 − |1100〉+ |1010〉)1432
CNOT42−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0100〉 − |0011〉 − |1101〉+ |1010〉)1432
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0+〉 − |0 + 1−〉 − |1− 0−〉+ |1 + 1+〉)3214
CT232−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0+〉 − 1√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)
−|1− 0−〉+ 1√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)]3214.
16) For |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉 − i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1− 0+〉+ i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34 SWAP13−−−−−→ 1
2
(|0101〉 − |1100〉 − |0011〉+ |1010〉)3214
H2H4−−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |1− 0+〉|0 + 1−〉+ |1 + 1+〉)3214
T21−−→ 1
2
(|0− 0−〉 − |1− 0+〉 − i|0 + 1−〉+ i|1 + 1+〉)3214
CT614−−−→ 1
2
[(|0− 0−〉 − i√
2
|0 + 1〉(|0〉+ i|1〉)
−|1− 0+〉) + i√
2
|1 + 1〉(|0〉 − i|1〉)]3214.
Appendix III: Proof of the Correctness of
generalized BQC protocols
At last, we consider that QFT are performed on 13
and 24 of |ξ〉12|θ〉34.
1) For |φ+〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
(|φ+〉|00〉+ |ψ+〉|11〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|φ+〉34 CNOT42−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|φ+〉|00〉+ |ψ+〉|11〉)1234.
2) For |φ+〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
√
2
(|ψ+〉|00〉+ |φ+〉|11〉)1234
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|φ−〉34 T
4
3−−→ 1
2
(|φ+〉|11〉+ 1√
2
|φ+〉|00〉)1234
CNOT32−−−−−→ 1
2
(|ψ+〉|11〉+ |φ+〉|00〉)1234
X3X4−−−→ 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|00〉+ |φ+〉|11〉)1234
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3) For |φ+〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1√
2
|φ−〉12(|00〉+ i|11〉)34.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|ψ+〉34 T
4
1−−→ 1
2
|φ−〉12(|01〉+ |10〉)34
T23X4−−−→ 1√
2
|φ−〉12(|00〉+ i|11〉)34
4) For |φ+〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ −1√
2
|ψ−〉12(|00〉+ i|11〉)34.
is equivalent to
|φ+〉12|ψ−〉34 T
4
1X2T
4
3T
2
3X4−−−−−−−−−→ 1√
2
|ψ−〉12(|00〉+ i|11〉)34
5) For |φ−〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)12|ψ+〉34.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|φ+〉34 X4T
6
1−−−→ 1√
2
(|00〉+ i|11〉)12|ψ+〉34
H2−−→ 1√
2
(|00〉+ |01〉+ i|10〉 − i|11〉)12|ψ+〉34
X2T
2
2−−−→ 1√
2
(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)12|ψ+〉34.
6) For |φ−〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
(|φ+〉+ i|ψ+〉)12|ψ+〉34.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|φ−〉34 X4T
4
3−−−→ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)12|ψ+〉34
T61−−→ 1√
2
(|00〉+ i|11〉)12|ψ+〉34
T22H2−−−→ 1√
2
(|φ+〉+ i|ψ+〉)12|ψ+〉34.
7) For |φ−〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
(|ψ−〉|ψ−〉+ i|φ−〉|ψ+〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34 H1−−→ 1
2
[(|0〉+ |1〉)|010〉 − (|0〉 − |1〉)|101〉
+(|0〉+ |1〉)|001〉 − (|0〉 − |1〉)|110〉]1234
T21⊗T22−−−−→ i
2
√
2
[(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|010〉 − (|0〉 − i|1〉)|101〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|001〉 − (|0〉 − i|1〉)|110〉]1234
CT431−−−→ i
2
√
2
[(|0〉 − i|1〉)i|010〉 − (|0〉 − i|1〉)|101〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|001〉 − (|0〉+ i|1〉)|110〉]1234
CT424−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[(|0〉 − i|1〉)i|010〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)|101〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|001〉 − (|0〉+ i|1〉)|110〉]1234
=
1√
2
(|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34 + i|φ−〉12|ψ+〉34)
8) For |φ−〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ i− 1
2
(|φ−〉|ψ−〉+ i|ψ−〉|ψ+〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 H1−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉+ |1〉)|010〉+ (|0〉+ |1〉)|001〉
−(|0〉 − |1〉)|101〉+ (|0〉 − |1〉)|110〉]1234
T22T
2
1−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉+ i|1〉)|010〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)|001〉
−(|0〉 − i|1〉)i|101〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
CT441−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉+ i|1〉)|010〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)|001〉
−(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|101〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
CT424−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉+ i|1〉)|010〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)|001〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|101〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
=
1√
2
(|φ−〉12|ψ−〉34 + i|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34).
9) For |ψ+〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
√
2
(|φ+〉|00〉 − |ψ+〉|11〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 Z3X2CNOT32−−−−−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|φ+〉|00〉 − |ψ+〉|11〉)1234.
10) For |ψ+〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
√
2
(|ψ+〉|00〉 − |φ+〉|11〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 CNOT42−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|ψ+〉|00〉 − |φ+〉|11〉)1234.
11) For |ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1
2
√
2
|φ−〉12(|00〉 − i|11〉)34.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ+〉34 T
6
3X4T
4
1X2−−−−−−−→ 1√
2
|φ−〉12(|00〉 − i|11〉)34.
12) For |ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ − 1
2
√
2
|ψ−〉12(|00〉 − i|11〉)34.
is equivalent to
|ψ+〉12|ψ−〉34 T
4
1−−→ 1√
2
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34
T24X4−−−→ 1√
2
|ψ−〉12(|00〉 − i|11〉)34.
13) For |ψ−〉12|φ+〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
[(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)|ψ+〉]1234.
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is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|φ+〉34 Z4X3−−−→ |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34
H2T
6
2−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[|00〉+ |01〉+ i|10〉 − i|11〉]1234
X2T
2
2−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)|ψ+〉]1234
14) For |ψ−〉12|φ−〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
[(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)|ψ+〉]1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|φ−〉34 T
2
1X2X4−−−−−→ 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉)|ψ−〉34
T41T
2
2H1−−−−−→ [(i|φ+〉+ |ψ+〉)|ψ+〉]1234.
15) For |ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
(i|φ−〉|ψ−〉+ |ψ−〉|ψ+〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|ψ+〉34 T
4
3T
2
2T
2
1H1−−−−−−−→ i
2
√
2
[(|0〉 − i|1〉)i|001〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)
|101〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|010〉〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)|110〉]1234
CT423−−−→ i√
2
(i|φ−〉|ψ−〉+ |ψ−〉|ψ+〉)1234.
16) For |ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34, this equation
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34 QFT−−−→ 1− i
2
(|φ−〉|ψ+〉+ i|ψ−〉|ψ−〉)1234.
is equivalent to
|ψ−〉12|ψ−〉34 T
2
2−−→ 1
2
(−|1001〉+ |1010〉+ i|0101〉 − i|0110〉]1234
T21H1−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉 − i|1〉)|001〉+ (|0〉 − i|1〉)|010〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|101〉 − (|0〉+ i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
CT431−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[−(|0〉 − i|1〉)|001〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)|010〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|101〉 − (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
CT424T
4
4−−−−−→ 1
2
√
2
[(|0〉 − i|1〉)|001〉+ (|0〉+ i|1〉)|010〉
+(|0〉+ i|1〉)i|101〉 − (|0〉 − i|1〉)i|110〉]1234
=
1
2
(|φ−〉|ψ+〉+ i|ψ−〉|ψ−〉)1234.
